Showing posts with label globalization. Show all posts
Showing posts with label globalization. Show all posts

Saturday, 27 March 2010

Nobel to Internet? and an interview with Jodi Dean



Some months ago, italian version of Wired started campaigning saying "Nobel Peace Prize should go to Internet". Gandhi never won the Nobel Peace Prize but Internet (=an item, not a person) might win the Nobel Peace Prize!! Why not give the Nobel Peace Prize to telephone cables or the air (that carries radiowaves)? (I would give the Nobel Peace Prize to BBC World Service for providing reliable information to people - living under dictatorships and not - for decades; but this is a different topic).


Jodi Dean (1962) is an american professor, she teaches political theory. I asked her about the idea of giving Internet the Nobel Peace Prize and other things. (Jodi Dean blogs here)

1) Italian version of Wired started lobbying for "Nobel Peace Prize should go to Internet" (http://www.internetforpeace.it/manifesto.cfm). What do you think about it? Do you think it's technological fetishism?

Of course it is techno fetishism, a ludicrous extension of the cult of the amateur and the fantasy that because crowd sourcing works for some things it works for everything; there is a middle ground between the false, romantic idea of the single genius and everyone


2) You wrote "In the US today there is a significant disconnect between politics circulating as content and official politics". Do you think that the election of Obama (probably impossible without Internet) changed this view? Can't it be seen like the come back of democracy?

No. Obama didn't need the internet to win (or, the internet wasn't the difference that made a difference although it is now an additional media field on which the game must be played). There were only 2 candidates; one was the least popular president ever in the midst of an economic debacle. Also, Obama raised more money--the candidate who raises the most wins. The shocking thing is that Obama didn't win by a larger margin. 'Come back of democracy'? I don't even know what that means--George W. Bush won his second term; the hideous Republicans in Congress were elected. All sorts of right-wing nut jobs are out there organizing, protesting, participating. The problem is not at all that democracy went away. The problem is that the left hasn't been able to use the democratic process to advance. Corporations love democracy--they give millions and millions to campaigns, candidates; they pay fortunes to lobbyists. Democracy is great for capitalism--just not for people.


3) Do you think that the economic crisis of 2008 (or better 2008-ongoing) is an event that makes to rethink theories of economic globalization?

If by 'rethink' you mean that fans of globalized neoliberalism can no longer deny the destructive force of capitalism, then I guess so. But how is this being done? The IMF is pressuring European countries to lower their debts--this means
cutting social services, which remains in keeping with neoliberalism. In the US, the big banks are once again saying screw you to the US government and giving massive bonuses; there has been no significant effort to bring them under control--derivatives (what Warren Buffet called financial weapons of mass destruction) remain unregulated. So, the real question is who is rethinking and what are the re-thoughts?


4) What is your point of view about theories like Manuel Castells'one, when an author seems so enthusiastic about internet, to talk about a network society?

Castells remains massively significant as the provider of one of the first comprehensive maps/over views/ of the shape of networked society. Is everything he said still correct? no. Did he leave stuff out? sure.
One way I look at it--Castells did the first map of the global; Hardt and Negri did the political equivalent of a Mercator projection. Using this as some kind of space of flows basis, I think Albert Laszlo-Barabasi is indispensable--
his account of the emergence of powerlaws and hubs in complex networks characterized by growth and preferential attachment make is absolutely clear why the division between multitude/empire can in no way be understood ontologically but only politically; network ontologies are characterized by extremes of inequality

Thursday, 5 March 2009

Globalization of football (soccer) communication

David Beckham invited on closing ceremony of olympic games, Beijing; August 24, 2008

Let's see the official sites of football (soccer) team of Serie A: how many languages are official sites available in?

milan 6 languages: italian, english, spanish, portuguese, chinese, japanese
inter 4 languages: italian, english, spanish, chinese
juventus 3 languages: italian, english, chinese
chievo, napoli, palermo 2 languages: italian, english

other important teams in Europe:

barcelona 7 languages: catalan, spanish, english, japanese, chinese, korean, arabic
bayern munich 5 languages: german, english, japanese, chinese, spanish
manchester utd 4 languages: english, chinese, japanese, korean
chelsea 4 languages: english, american version (?), korean, chinese, russian
real madrid 3 languages: spanish, english, japanese
psv eindhoven 3 languages: dutch, english, spanish
manchester city 2 languages: english, chinese
ajax 2 languages: dutch, english
porto 2 languages: portuguese, english
olympique de marseille 2 languages: french, english
borussia dortmund 2 languages: german, english
zenit st petersburg 2 languages: russian, english
red star belgrade 2 languages: serbian, english
liverpool 1 language: english
benfica 1 language: portuguese

obviously somebody doesn't understand the globalization of audience in football (soccer) ...

Tuesday, 10 June 2008

Much rumour about nothing


above: the last 12 months of AS Roma stocks

UPDATE about globalization of football (soccer) ownership post

On 1st May i wrote:

"There are several rumours that George Soros (hungarian-born US speculator and philanthropist) is going to buy Roma ; Steven Horowitz of Inner Circle Sports has been recently seen in Rome more than once, therefore someone does want to buy the club. Some newspapers wrote Soros offered about 210 million Euro for 67% of shares, which is 2,37 Euro per shares, more than double the current price. Will it be enough for the family that now owns the club?"

I was wrong because on 3rd June MF-Dow Jones (one news agency for italian stock exchange) wrote that Michael Vachon [director of communications at Soros Fund Management (SFM). Mr. Vachon serves as spokesperson for the Fund and for Mr. Soros personally] told them that Soros isn't interested about buying that team.
It might be usefull to ask some questions:
1) Was it true that George Soros (before June) wanted to buy As Roma?
If not, who started the rumour? If it was true, what went wrong?
2) Why don't the current owners (Sensi family) explain what happened in the past months?
3) The current owners need to pay back (reports talk about 370 mil of euro) some banks. Do they know how to do that without selling the team?

Thursday, 1 May 2008

Globalization of football (soccer) ownership



This season we've seen 4 teams in Champions League: 3 english teams (Man utd, Chelsea and Liverpool) and 1 spanish (Barcelona); and we now we can be sure we'll see 2 english teams (Man utd and Chelsea) for the final, scheduled on May 21st 2008, Moscow.
Who are the owners of theese teams?
Barcelona is owned by its members, they are more than 150 thousands and every four years they have the right to vote in the club’s presidential elections.
Let's see what happened in english football in the recent years:
1997 egyptian billionaire Mohamed Al-Fayed bought Fulham FC
2003 russian billionaire Roman Abramovich bought Chelsea FC
2005 US businessman Malcolm Glazer bought all of the shares and delist Man Utd from
London Stock Exchange
2006 US entrepreneur Randy Lerner bought Aston Villa FC
2006 irish Niall Quinn bought Sunderland AFC
2006 icelandic billionaire Björgólfur Guðmundsson bought West Ham United
2007 US businessmen George Gillett and Tom Hicks bought Liverpool FC
2007 thai businessman and politician Thaksin Shinawatra bought Manchester City

All the most important teams (except Arsenal) today are owned by foreigners, probably there's a connection between the foreign investors and the first final with two english clubs.

There are several rumours that George Soros (hungarian-born US speculator and philanthropist) is going to buy Roma ; Steven Horowitz of Inner Circle Sports has been recently seen in Rome more than once, therefore someone does want to buy the club. Some newspapers wrote Soros offered about 210 million Euro for 67% of shares, which is 2,37 Euro per shares, more than double the current price. Will it be enough for the family that now owns the club?

If you don't have any idea why people like football (or soccer, if you are from USA), you can have a look at this research:
Parity and Predictability of Competitions - 2006
(you can view and download the 6-page pdf file)
3 US researchers (Eli Ben-Naim, Sidney Redner and Federico Vazquez) studied the results of nearly all regular season competitions in 4 major American professional sports leagues (Major League Baseball, National Hockey League, National Basketball Association and National Football League) and English Premier League; they analized more than 300,000 games in over a century.
It is hard to say whether to rely on this study (they admitted "home and away games are not incorporated into our model, but game location does affect the outcome of games") or not; anyway at the end they wrote "soccer and baseball are the most competitive sports while basketball and [US] football are the least"

Tuesday, 12 February 2008

Globalization of films' content



Interesting article from New York Times: screen writers work for US audience and, specially, for foreign audiences.

Moviegoers in Seoul will love this film

by Brooks Barnes
Published: January 27, 2008

LOS ANGELES — An avid moviegoer, Lindsay Bern takes in a flick at her local multiplex about twice a week. But Ms. Bern, the co-owner of a Los Angeles recording studio, has recently become irritated by what she sees as a disturbing trend on the big screen: the obliteration of New York City.

In particular, she has been annoyed by “I Am Legend”, the Warner Brothers hit that stars Will Smith in a post-apocalyptic Manhattan, and “Cloverfield”, the Paramount film about a monster that implodes the Empire State Building, tears down the Brooklyn Bridge and generally reduces the city to a smoking pile of rubble and despair.

“Can’t they destroy another city for once?” Ms. Bern said in an interview at a local movie theater. “It’s despicable that the studios are using the destruction of New York to sell movies to me.”

Hollywood uses the stunt to sell movies all right — but not primarily to Ms. Bern or anyone else in the United States, for that matter. If Americans go to see the Statue of Liberty’s head ripped off, as they have in droves for “Cloverfield,” all the better. But the fans the studios are really trying to attract with such imagery are in Eastern Europe, South Korea and Latin America.

New York City, studio executives say, is the only United States metropolis with a skyline that is instantly recognizable the world over. (San Francisco is a possible exception, but razing a city that is already teetering on the seismic brink is not as much fun.) Aren’t Americans growing a little tired of seeing the Big Apple being splattered? “Maybe,” a senior Paramount executive said, “but that is what will sell it overseas.”

To gain control over runaway costs, the movie industry is increasingly striving for a one-size-fits-all strategy when it comes to the types of films it churns out and the megawatt marketing campaigns that accompany them. But while the studios once tailored their product to the tastes of American audiences and tweaked it for the international crowd, the reverse is becoming the norm.

Indeed, the international movie business — of strategic importance to studios for two decades — has become so lucrative that many movies are now built primarily to appeal to people outside the United States. Given the broad range of cultures to which movies must play, their content will become only simpler as the trend grows. It surely isn’t lost on entertainment companies that complex, politically themed pictures like “In the Valley of Elah”, a tough sell at home, were also disastrous abroad.

“Clearly, international is playing a bigger role than ever in the green-light process for pictures,” said Jeff Blake, chairman for worldwide marketing and distribution at the Columbia TriStar Motion Picture Group. “You’re having big conversations about what you can do to increase your chances overseas.”

What sells best overseas is a simple message, preferably one that is nonverbal and can be communicated with a single dominant image. “The Day After Tomorrow” was an easy global sell for 20th Century Fox. (Manhattan freezes over.) But “Spanglish,” with its complicated story about an Anglo chef falling for a Hispanic household helper, and with a tough title to translate, was a nightmare for Sony international marketers.

Ticket sales at theaters in the United States have declined over the last decade despite the efforts of studios and theater owners. In 2007, sales totaled $9.7 billion, up 4 percent from the previous year, according to Media by Numbers, a box-office tracking company. But the attendance figures puncture that happy story: the number of people going to the movies was flat, after a narrow increase in 2006 and three previous years of sharp declines.

The international market, meanwhile, is sizzling. Foreign receipts for the six biggest studios rose 9 percent in 2007 from a year earlier, to $9.4 billion. While there are no reliable independent data for attendance, the number of people outside the United States going to the movies is soaring, too, partly because more modern theaters are popping up, according to Patrick Wachsberger, the co-chairman of Summit Entertainment, a boutique studio with a large foreign film sales business.

Spider-Man 3” illustrates the shift. Released last May, the movie was a low point for the series at the domestic box office when ticket sales are adjusted for inflation, according to Box Office Mojo, another tracking service. But foreign sales for the picture were the best ever for the series, totaling $554 million.

Spider-Man has a lot of company. Most studio movies now gross substantially more abroad than they do at home.

The growth overseas — American movies made $158 million in China last year, for example, up 38 percent from 2006 — helps explain what kinds of films show up on marquees in St. Louis and Seattle.

Multicultural organizations routinely criticize Hollywood, saying it fails to cast many minorities in leading roles. They point to movies like “Madea’s Family Reunion”, which featured a mainly African-American cast, that have performed well at the box office. That picture, which cost about $6 million to make, sold $63.3 million in tickets at North American theaters.

The big studios know that these films make money, but they shy away from them in large part because multicultural casts are a hard sell overseas. “Madea's Family Reunion” sold only $50,939 in tickets abroad. “Urban movies just don’t travel,” Mr. Wachsberger said.

International movie ticket sales, in broad terms, used to be one of two things: gravy or insurance. If a film looked as if it would be a hit, studios would take a chance on how it would perform overseas, knowing that the receipts would only make them richer. If a picture was deemed a difficult sell, studios would sell off parts of the overseas distribution rights to local companies in advance, cutting the risk.

The situation started to change in the 1990s, as companies became more global and foreign investors developed more of an appetite for the movie business. As Hollywood started relying more heavily on action extravaganzas, and as movie attendance in the United States started to drop, the business had to court a wider audience.

WITH many markets still growing, the practice of tailoring scripts for a global audience is only going to increase, said David Maisel, the chairman of Marvel Studios.

He should know. “The Incredible Hulk” from Marvel (set for a June 13 premiere) has been meticulously constructed to appeal to moviegoers across the planet. In one sequence, Dr. Bruce Banner, the scientist who transforms into a green monster when his emotions run high, travels to Brazil to search for a cure. Instead of building Brazil on a back lot, Mr. Maisel sent the production to Rio de Janeiro — a move that could help sell the movie in South America.

If that doesn’t work, he always has a backup: The script also calls for a fight of comic book proportions in which the Hulk must call upon the hero within to save a city from “total destruction.”

Care to guess which city?

Saturday, 24 November 2007

English language rules



Interesting article from FT:

Whose language?

By Michael Skapinker
Published: November 8 2007 19:55

Chung Dong-young, a former television anchorman and candidate to be president of South Korea, may be behind in the opinion polls but one of his campaign commitments is eye-catching. If elected, he promises a vast increase in English teaching so that young Koreans do not have to go abroad to learn the language. The country needed to “solve the problem of families separated for English learning”, the Korea Times reported him saying.

In China, Yu Minhong has turned New Oriental, the company he founded, into the country’s biggest provider of private education, with more than 1m students over the past financial year, the overwhelming majority learning English. In Chile, the government has said it wants its population to be bilingual in English and Spanish within a generation.

No one is certain how many people are learning English. Ten years ago, the British Council thought it was around 1bn. A report, English Next, published by the council last year, forecast that the number of English learners would probably peak at around 2bn in 10-15 years.

How many people already speak English? David Crystal, one of the world’s leading experts on the language and author of more than 100 books on the subject, estimates that 1.5bn people – around one-quarter of the world’s population – can communicate reasonably well in English.

Latin was once the shared language over a vast area, but that was only in Europe and North Africa. Never in recorded history has a language been as widely spoken as English is today. The reason millions are learning it is simple: it is the language of international business and therefore the key to prosperity. It is not just that Microsoft, Google and Vodafone conduct their business in English; it is the language in which Chinese speak to Brazilians and Germans to Indonesians.

David Graddol, the author of English Next, says it is tempting to view the story of English as a triumph for its native speakers in North America, the British Isles and Australasia – but that would be a mistake. Global English has entered a more complex phase, changing in ways that the older English-speaking countries cannot control and might not like.

Commentators on global English ask three principal questions. First, is English likely to be challenged by other fast-growing languages such as Mandarin, Spanish or Arabic? Second, as English spreads and is influenced by local languages, could it fragment, as Latin did into Italian and French – or might it survive but spawn new languages, as German did with Dutch and Swedish? Third, if English does retain a standard character that allows it to continue being understood everywhere, will the standard be that of the old English-speaking world or something new and different?

Mr Graddol says the idea of English being supplanted as the world language is not fanciful. About 50 years ago, English had more native speakers than any language except Mandarin. Today both Spanish and Hindi-Urdu have as many native speakers as English does. By the middle of this century, English could fall into fifth place behind Arabic in the numbers who speak it as a first language.

Some believe English will survive because it has a natural advantage: it is easy to learn. Apart from a pesky “s” at the end of the present tense third person singular (“she runs”), verbs remain unchanged no matter who you are talking about. (I run, you run, they run; we ran, he ran, they ran.) Definite and indefinite articles are unaffected by gender (the actor, the actress; a bull, a cow.) There is no need to remember whether a table is masculine or feminine.

There is, however, plenty that is difficult about English. Try explaining its phrasal verbs – the difference, for example, between “I stood up to him” and “I stood him up”. Mr Crystal dismisses the idea that English has become the world’s language because it is easy. In an essay published last year, he said Latin’s grammatical complexity did not hamper its spread. “A language becomes a world language for extrinsic reasons only, and these all relate to the power of the people who speak it,” he wrote. The British empire carried English to all those countries on which the sun never set; American economic and cultural clout en­sured English’s dominance after the British empire had faded.

So could China’s rise see Mandarin becoming the world’s language? It may happen. “Thinking back a thousand years, who would have predicted the demise of Latin?” Mr Crystal asks. But at the moment there is little sign of it, he says. The Chinese are rushing to learn English.

Mr Graddol agrees that we are unlikely to see English challenged in our lifetime. Once a lingua franca is established, it takes a long time to shift. Latin may be disappearing but it remained the language of science for generations and was used by the Roman Catholic church well into the 20th century.

As for English fragmenting, Mr Graddol argues it has already happened. “There are many Englishes that you and I wouldn’t understand,” he says. World Englishes, a recent book by Andy Kirkpatrick, professor at the Hong Kong Institute of Education, gives some examples. An Indian teenager’s journal contains this entry: “Two rival groups are out to have fun . . . you know generally indulge in dhamal [a type of dance] and pass time. So, what do they do? Pick on a bechaara bakra [poor goat] who has entered college.” Prof Kirkpatrick also provides this sample of Nigerian pidgin English: “Monkey de work, baboon dey chop” (Monkeys work, baboons eat).

It is unlikely, however, that this fragmentation will lead to the disappearance of English as a language understood around the world. It is common for speakers of English to switch from one or other variant to a use of language more appropriate for work, school or international communication. Mr Crystal says modern communication through television, film and the internet means the world is likely to hold on to an English that is widely understood.

The issue is: whose English will it be? Non-native speakers now outnumber native English-speakers by three to one. As hundreds of millions more learn the language, that imbalance will grow. Mr Graddol says the majority of encounters in English today take place between non-native speakers. Indeed, he adds, many business meetings held in English appear to run more smoothly when there are no native English-speakers present.

Native speakers are often poor at ensuring that they are understood in international discussions. They tend to think they need to avoid longer words, when comprehension problems are more often caused by their use of colloquial and metaphorical English.

Barbara Seidlhofer, professor of English and applied linguistics at the University of Vienna, says relief at the absence of native speakers is common. “When we talk to people (often professionals) about international communication, this observation is made very often indeed. We haven’t conducted a systematic study of this yet, so what I say is anecdotal for the moment, but there seems to be very widespread agreement about it,” she says. She quotes an Austrian banker as saying: “I always find it easier to do business [in English] with partners from Greece or Russia or Denmark. But when the Irish call, it gets complicated and taxing.”

On another occasion, at an international student conference in Amsterdam, conducted in English, the lone British representative was asked to be “less English” so that the others could understand her.

Prof Seidlhofer is also founding director of the Vienna-Oxford International Corpus of English (Voice), which is recording and transcribing spoken English interactions between speakers of the language around the world. She says her team has noticed that non-native speakers are varying standard English grammar in several ways. Even the most competent sometimes leave the “s” off the third person singular. It is also common for non-native speakers to use “which” for humans and “who” for non- humans (“things who” and “people which”).

Prof Seidlhofer adds that many non-native speakers leave out definite and indefinite articles where they are required in standard English or put them in where standard English does not use them. Examples are “they have a respect for all” or “he is very good person”. Nouns that are not plural in native-speaker English are used as plurals by non-native speakers (“informations”, “knowledges”, “advices”). Other variations include “make a discussion”, “discuss about something” or “phone to somebody”.

Many native English speakers will have a ready riposte: these are not variations, they are mistakes. “Knowledges” and “phone to somebody” are plain wrong. Many non-native speakers who teach English around the world would agree. But language changes, and so do notions of grammatical correctness. Mr Crystal points out that plurals such as “informations” were once regarded as correct and were used by Samuel Johnson.

Those who insist on standard English grammar remain in a powerful position. Scientists and academics who want their work published in international journals have to adhere to the grammatical rules followed by the native English-speaking elites.

But spoken English is another matter. Why should non-native speakers bother with what native speakers regard as correct? Their main aim, after all, is to be understood by one another. As Mr Graddol says, in most cases there is no native speaker present.

Prof Seidlhofer says that the English spoken by non-native speakers “is a natural language, and natural languages are difficult to control by ‘legislation’.

“I think rather than a new international standard, what we are looking at is the emergence of a new ‘international attitude’, the recognition and awareness that in many international contexts interlocutors do not need to speak like native speakers, to compare themselves to them and thus always end up ‘less good’ – a new international assertiveness, so to speak.”

When native speakers work in an international organisation, some report their language changing. Mr Crystal has written: “On several occasions, I have encountered English-as-a-first-language politicians, diplomats and civil servants working in Brussels commenting on how they have felt their own English being pulled in the direction of these foreign-language patterns . . . These people are not ‘talking down’ to their colleagues or consciously adopting simpler expressions, for the English of their interlocutors may be as fluent as their own. It is a natural process of accommodation, which in due course could lead to new standardised forms.”

Perhaps written English will eventually make these accommodations too. Today, having an article published in the Harvard Business Review or the British Medical Journal represents a substantial professional accomplishment for a business academic from China or a medical researcher from Thailand. But it is possible to imagine a time when a pan-Asian journal, for example, becomes equally, or more, prestigious and imposes its own “Globish” grammatical standards on writers – its editors changing “the patient feels” to “the patient feel”.

Native English speakers may wince but are an ever-shrinking minority.

Wednesday, 31 October 2007

Interview with Naomi Klein



From the magazine Alternet an interview with Naomi Klein.

Why Can't the U.S. Have the Debate about Naomi Klein's Book That Europe Has?

By Jan Frel, AlterNet. Posted September 21, 2007.

In Europe and Canada debate is raging about Naomi Klein's new book on disaster capitalism, The Shock Doctrine. This interview with Klein considers why U.S. public debate is unable to ask fundamental questions about our economic system.

Naomi Klein's new book, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, tells the history of how the American version of "free market" capitalism has spread in moments of crisis and catastrophe, when societies are too traumatized and disoriented to challenge the introduction of radical economic policies that go against their own interests.

The Shock Doctrine has already been published and translated in several countries. Excerpts from Klein's book were published in the British newspaper the Guardian, and discussion about the book has raged on its online site Comment Is Free, as well as in the German, French and Canadian press. I attended Klein's U.S. book launch event at the New York Society for Ethical Culture on Sept. 17, where she described her work and her experiences dealing with a foreign press frequently hostile to her arguments.

At least the foreign press is willing to tangle with writers who offer critiques of the capitalist system. There is plenty of economic coverage in the U.S., but fundamental questions on issues such as whether privatization of public assets benefits the public and if the focus on short-term economic growth is harmful in the long run are simply not discussed. I wondered how Klein's book, which has hit the best-seller lists all over Europe, would fare in the U.S. and what Klein's expectations were for the U.S. audience. I spoke with her on the phone about this and the issues she raises in The Shock Doctrine on Sept. 19.

Jan Frel: Your book has 70 pages of footnotes and has citations from over 1,000 sources. At the book launch in New York, you referred to this as your "body armor." The thinking seems to be that if you can back up what you're saying, then it has to be accepted. Is this what will give it legitimacy in the mainstream media?

Naomi Klein: It's more for the debate about my work. In the attempts to dismiss my work as conspiracies theories, the footnotes help.

Frel: It's often times the case that books that make powerful and damning claims with complete accuracy still don't break into public debate or hit the audience that ought to confront them. Isn't there something else that prevents radical interpretations of society and economics and buried history from reaching public debate?

Klein: I think that's true -- it's certainly true in this country. I wasn't talking about the problem my book would have getting into the mainstream; it's more about the debates around it. My books do get into the mainstream -- outside the U.S. That doesn't mean they aren't contested, but in Canada for example, The Shock Doctrine is already at No. 3 on Amazon. [Currently at No. 43 in the United States.]

Another book I did, No Logo, was a mainstream book in most of the countries where it was published, except for the U.S. In the U.S. it never was. The context I talked about the need for support for my arguments is in cases where my book is being debated and argued. So in the U.S., I totally agree that having solid footnotes are no guarantee that you can start a mainstream debate. I don't have any confidence that this book will be in the mainstream debate in the United States.

Frel: A lot of what you're taking on in The Shock Doctrine is a concept that is fused in deep into a big part of the American psyche -- that "the free market" and "free enterprise," which we don't typically debate or condemn in the mainstream but are to blame for a lot of the things the public does discern as problems, like our healthcare system. But how do you get people to see that they are being screwed by their own dominant economic beliefs?

Klein: It's actually not that hard. The hard part is getting past the media wall.

Frel: At your U.S. book launch on Monday you talked about getting past the "intellectual police lines" that prevent discussion.

Klein: That's a different kind of situation. In Britain, it's a mainstream book being debated on the BBC, the Times of London, the Guardian and so on. It's being dismissed in part -- part of the discussion is an attempt to dismiss it. When I was talking about "intellectual police lines," it was in reference to the kinds of questions I was getting from mainstream journalists in Europe and in Canada. But in the U.S., I would say that's this is not really the issue -- it's whether you get access at all.

Frel: Do you think that it's because in the States, there isn't really any debate about alternatives to our economic system in any form? In Europe, where your book has already been released, there is at least the residue of a public debate that is willing to debate fundamental questions on economic systems and the social contract.

Klein: In most parts of the world, it's easier to even identify the radical policies of capitalism as contested territory, as something to debate. Whereas in the United States, these policies are the air we breathe; they are invisible almost because they are so hegemonic. For example, when I talk about privatization in Canada, people understand what that means -- it's about the drive to privatize our healthcare system and our education system, and there is a very clear grasp in the public mind about what the public sphere actually is. People understand there that this is something to defend against -- that there is something to privatize, while in the U.S., the agenda to privatize has succeeded so fully that these ideas seem more abstract because the idea of the public sphere is almost abstract.

When I'm talking about these ideas in France or the U.K., people know what "public" is. There are large parts of their life that exist within a nonmarket space.

Frel: So do you think it's an issue here in America where people don't want to consider these questions or are unable to?

Klein: I think it's the issue of the media line, and there are a lot of issues around it. It's very hard to have discussion anything outside the parameters of partisan politics in this country.

Frel: It's been my experience that it's not always the issue that the media is preventing discussion, but rather that the media working on behalf of the public's general desire not wanting to get into an issue. For example, this Monday, AlterNet ran article about the recent report that 1.2 million civilians have died violent deaths since the U.S. invasion. It was our top story, and the number of people who read it (24,000) was far lower than we expected.

Klein: Really? And that's a progressive audience.

Frel: It seems to me that it's this kind of a phenomenon that has media, including the corporate media, acting on behalf the audience's "intellectual police lines."

Klein: I think it's a vicious cycle. The media acts as an amplifier.

Frel: It's also responsive to the interests of the audience.

Klein: It is, but look at Lou Dobbs. Here you have a CNN news anchor who makes a concerted decision that he is going to put the disappearing American middle class and the effects of outsourcing on TV every night, and he's going to use his pulpit to drum up outrage, except that he decides that he's going to direct that outrage to the weakest people in society, to immigrants. But what's interesting about that, talking about outsourcing, talking about free trade, talking about the middle class -- any media outlet in the past 20 years could have done a story on that, giving the audience permission to have outrage instead of ignoring it or normalizing it, and saying this is just the way the world works. Lou Dobbs made the conscious decision to make his show a platform for outrage, and people were attracted to it because they really are upset, and they had it validated back to them.

I think the same thing could happen with Iraqi casualties if you had the media saying night after night that this is a scandal and really put a human face on those deaths.

Frel: Your book may encounter resistance at the mainstream level here in the States, but there is an audience of progressives and people who consume alternative media who are certain to embrace it. How does your book speak to their sensibilities, and how do you think they will receive it?

Klein: The book is an attempt to front burner the economic project and the economic ideology that I think is so much at the root of the front-page stories of our time: climate change, preemptive war, the resurgence of torture. I believe we need an analytic framework, and I think the book provides one -- not the only one, but anything that draws connections -- I think that progressives and readers of alternative media aren't going to be shocked by the information in the book. The hope is that the analysis is empowering. I know as a reader what's valuable is having connections made -- you're often bombarded with information in an analytic vacuum you can feel terribly hopeless, but when you make those connections, even when the connections are grim, you're more oriented.

As a writer, I'm very pleased with the reception to the book. Already we've got people writing into the website citing examples of disaster capitalism: "Look at what's going on in Greece, they're handing over land after the forest fires. Look at what's going on in Peru." All you can hope for as an analyst is that people read the newspaper better.

Frel:And you have a daringly simple solution for events of disaster capitalism that you identify, which I summarize as: Society should be informed and aware of what governments are trying to do to them after a catastrophe and apply this lens of analysis to their living context.

Klein: Shock only works if you don't know it's happening to you. Shock is a state of disorientation, which happens when we can't match events with analysis. For me, just understanding how shock affects our brains and that there is a philosophy of how to exploit that opportunity and push through economic policies people wouldn't normally accept in that window of time -- just realizing that makes you more resistant. But this is not my solution. I provide examples in my book of societies that have learned from their history when they were exploited in moments of shock, and delegated authority to figures of security that promised to take care of them. Because they have learned those simple lessons, they've become more shock resistant. But it does require looking at history without the blinders of denial.

In the sense that the book is an alternative history, I do hope that it helps people become more oriented, both in terms of more connected to our recent past, our pre-9/11 past, and more aware of what is happening in a moment of crisis or disaster.

The timing of The Shock Doctrine's release in Canada is very relevant here because it just hosted a summit with George Bush and Mexican President Calderon to meet with Prime Minister Steven Harper to talk about the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) which is basically like NAFTA-plus -- NAFTA plus security issues. The SPP is an example of the shock doctrine I outline in the sense that this was an agenda that would have been unspeakable in terms of integration with the United States before 9/11, and in the panic after -- in that shock -- the SPP agenda moved forward in technocratic circles, and it was presented as a done deal.

Once Canadians began learning about the SPP, they started rejecting it, and then they had this summit, where it was announced that, "Don't worry, nothing's going to happen here." But they said in the final press conference at the summit in Montebello, Quebec, at the end of August that the one exception that they would push for the SPP to be pushed through is if there's a disaster -- if there's an avian flu outbreak or a terrorist attack or a natural disaster -- then they would implement tightened integration between security forces in all these countries.

In Canada this was front-page news -- in the U.S., it wasn't reported on. When my book came out a week later people saw the connections immediately. They realized that what the Canadian government was saying was, the next time there's a disaster, we will use it as a moment of opportunity to push through these policies that you're rejecting where there isn't a disaster going on. It's incredibly naked.

Frel: There's an issue that I've seen a lot of critics and journalists already getting into about your book, and I've seen that you have a good term already to explain it. You don't argue that economic elites try to cause disasters they reap the benefits from, rather that they have "acute intellectual disaster preparedness" -- they are only cynical enough to take advantage of catastrophe.

Klein: I think that's right. The think-tank infrastructure in this country is organized to leap into the chasm right away after disaster has struck. The Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute stockpile free market ideas in the way that people stockpile canned goods. I don't say that anyone is causing these disasters for their benefit, but in the book I do say that if there's anything the market delivers on is a stream of increasingly intense disasters. I think the current economic model in America is a slow-motion disaster.

Now we're at the intersection of a weak public infrastructure that has been starved for two and a half decades and increasingly heavy weather, thanks to climate change, which I believe has a lot to do with this pursuit of short-term growth that is at the heart of the economic model, and we're going to have more and more of these disasters. If we aren't careful, each of these disasters offers the opening and a rationale for more disaster capitalism.

Frel: An economic feedback cycle, like the one scientists are warning about the compounding power of the effects of climate change.

Klein: If there's one thing we don't need on this planet it's disasters, because disaster capitalism will keep coming.

Frel: Since capital is not monolithic and has competing interests among economic elites, it seems as though the disaster capitalism model would have taught some of its adherents by now that it doesn't work in the long term, or at least have some elites who would fight against it. You write extensively on the free market laboratory implemented in Chile when Pinochet took over, which of course was a failure. Isn't there resistance to disaster capitalism at the levels of economic power and government that institute them?

Klein: Yes. In the Chile chapter I talk about how the country's manufacturing sector was furious that cheap products were flooding into the country, that people who were making the money in this case were the people involved in speculative finance. There are absolutely these competing interests. If you look at the Bush administration, this is an administration that is particularly tied to the disaster capitalism complex: the arms dealing, homeland security, pharmaceuticals that treat pandemics and the oil industry, which benefits handsomely from each and every disaster.

Frel: There's also the phenomenon that the way the capital markets work is to search out weak points and opportunities in any circumstance in which they arise.

Klein: You can depend on capital to arrive at any vacuum and exploit any weakness. It is not the case that politicians need to facilitate this and fund it lavishly with taxpayer money. What is disturbing is the seamless alliance between government and capitalism.

Frel: You end the book with a quote from a declassified letter from Kissinger to Nixon where he says that the real threat of Allende wasn't what he was telling the public -- that Allende wanted this totalitarian system. Kissinger wrote that the real threat was the problem of social democracy spreading. What was so scary about this idea to him?

Klein: I think it's always been the scary idea, because it's so popular. People like to have consumer choice, and they also like to have basic necessities protected and to have a life with dignity: housing, water, electricity, healthcare. And with democratic socialism you can actually have both: a mixed economy that has an essentially controlled economic model but that has room for diversity within it and has these social guarantees. And that's always been the bigger threat to a radical vision of capitalism than totalitarian communism, because people don't actually like living in communist countries, but they really do like living in democratic socialist countries.

Naomi Klein's works:
-2000 No logo
-2002 Fences and Windows
-2007 The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism

Naomi Klein's official website

Monday, 29 October 2007

Is or isn't the world flat?



In 2005 New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman wrote the book The World Is Flat and Pankaj Ghemawat from Foreign Policy explains us why he disagrees.

Why the World Isn’t Flat

Pankaj Ghemawat is the Anselmo Rubiralta professor of global strategy at IESE Business School and the Jaime and Josefina Chua Tiampo professor of business administration at Harvard Business School. His new book is Redefining Global Strategy (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, September 2007).

Globalization has bound people, countries, and markets closer than ever, rendering national borders relics of a bygone era—or so we’re told. But a close look at the data reveals a world that’s just a fraction as integrated as the one we thought we knew. In fact, more than 90 percent of all phone calls, Web traffic, and investment is local. What’s more, even this small level of globalization could still slip away.


Ideas will spread faster, leaping borders. Poor countries will have immediate access to information that was once restricted to the industrial world and traveled only slowly, if at all, beyond it. Entire electorates will learn things that once only a few bureaucrats knew. Small companies will offer services that previously only giants could provide. In all these ways, the communications revolution is profoundly democratic and liberating, leveling the imbalance between large and small, rich and poor.” The global vision that Frances Cairncross predicted in her Death of Distance appears to be upon us. We seem to live in a world that is no longer a collection of isolated, “local” nations, effectively separated by high tariff walls, poor communications networks, and mutual suspicion. It’s a world that, if you believe the most prominent proponents of globalization, is increasingly wired, informed, and, well, “flat.”

It’s an attractive idea. And if publishing trends are any indication, globalization is more than just a powerful economic and political transformation; it’s a booming cottage industry. According to the U.S. Library of Congress’s catalog, in the 1990s, about 500 books were published on globalization. Between 2000 and 2004, there were more than 4,000. In fact, between the mid-1990s and 2003, the rate of increase in globalization-related titles more than doubled every 18 months.

Amid all this clutter, several books on the subject have managed to attract significant attention. During a recent TV interview, the first question I was asked—quite earnestly—was why I still thought the world was round. The interviewer was referring of course to the thesis of New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman’s bestselling book The World Is Flat. Friedman asserts that 10 forces—most of which enable connectivity and collaboration at a distance—are “flattening” the Earth and leveling a playing field of global competitiveness, the likes of which the world has never before seen.

It sounds compelling enough. But Friedman’s assertions are simply the latest in a series of exaggerated visions that also include the “end of history” and the “convergence of tastes.” Some writers in this vein view globalization as a good thing—an escape from the ancient tribal rifts that have divided humans, or an opportunity to sell the same thing to everyone on Earth. Others lament its cancerous spread, a process at the end of which everyone will be eating the same fast food. Their arguments are mostly characterized by emotional rather than cerebral appeals, a reliance on prophecy, semiotic arousal (that is, treating everything as a sign), a focus on technology as the driver of change, an emphasis on education that creates “new” people, and perhaps above all, a clamor for attention. But they all have one thing in common: They’re wrong.
The Failed States Index 2007 - Click Here to Buy the Poster

In truth, the world is not nearly as connected as these writers would have us believe. Despite talk of a new, wired world where information, ideas, money, and people can move around the planet faster than ever before, just a fraction of what we consider globalization actually exists. The portrait that emerges from a hard look at the way companies, people, and states interact is a world that’s only beginning to realize the potential of true global integration. And what these trend’s backers won’t tell you is that globalization’s future is more fragile than you know.

THE 10 PERCENT PRESUMPTION

The few cities that dominate international financial activity—Frankfurt, Hong Kong, London, New York—are at the height of modern global integration; which is to say, they are all relatively well connected with one another. But when you examine the numbers, the picture is one of extreme connectivity at the local level, not a flat world. What do such statistics reveal? Most types of economic activity that could be conducted either within or across borders turn out to still be quite domestically concentrated.

One favorite mantra from globalization champions is how “investment knows no boundaries.” But how much of all the capital being invested around the world is conducted by companies outside of their home countries? The fact is, the total amount of the world’s capital formation that is generated from foreign direct investment (FDI) has been less than 10 percent for the last three years for which data are available (2003–05). In other words, more than 90 percent of the fixed investment around the world is still domestic. And though merger waves can push the ratio higher, it has never reached 20 percent. In a thoroughly globalized environment, one would expect this number to be much higher—about 90 percent, by my calculation. And FDI isn’t an odd or unrepresentative example.

As the chart above demonstrates, the levels of internationalization associated with cross-border migration, telephone calls, management research and education, private charitable giving, patenting, stock investment, and trade, as a fraction of gross domestic product (GDP), all stand much closer to 10 percent than 100 percent. The biggest exception in absolute terms—the trade-to-GDP ratio shown at the bottom of the chart—recedes most of the way back down toward 20 percent if you adjust for certain kinds of double-counting. So if someone asked me to guess the internationalization level of some activity about which I had no particular information, I would guess it to be much closer to 10 percent—the average for the nine categories of data in the chart—than to 100 percent. I call this the “10 Percent Presumption.”

More broadly, these and other data on cross-border integration suggest a semiglobalized world, in which neither the bridges nor the barriers between countries can be ignored. From this perspective, the most astonishing aspect of various writings on globalization is the extent of exaggeration involved. In short, the levels of internationalization in the world today are roughly an order of magnitude lower than those implied by globalization proponents.

A STRONG NATIONAL DEFENSE

If you buy into the more extreme views of the globalization triumphalists, you would expect to see a world where national borders are irrelevant, and where citizens increasingly view themselves as members of ever broader political entities. True, communications technologies have improved dramatically during the past 100 years. The cost of a three-minute telephone call from New York to London fell from $350 in 1930 to about 40 cents in 1999, and it is now approaching zero for voice-over-Internet telephony. And the Internet itself is just one of many newer forms of connectivity that have progressed several times faster than plain old telephone service. This pace of improvement has inspired excited proclamations about the pace of global integration. But it’s a huge leap to go from predicting such changes to asserting that declining communication costs will obliterate the effects of distance. Although the barriers at borders have declined significantly, they haven’t disappeared.

To see why, consider the Indian software industry—a favorite of Friedman and others. Friedman cites Nandan Nilekani, the CEO of the second-largest such firm, Infosys, as his muse for the notion of a flat world. But what Nilekani has pointed out privately is that while Indian software programmers can now serve the United States from India, access is assured, in part, by U.S. capital being invested—quite literally—in that outcome. In other words, the success of the Indian IT industry is not exempt from political and geographic constraints. The country of origin matters—even for capital, which is often considered stateless.

Or consider the largest Indian software firm, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS). Friedman has written at least two columns in the New York Times on TCS’s Latin American operations: “[I]n today’s world, having an Indian company led by a Hungarian-Uruguayan servicing American banks with Montevidean engineers managed by Indian technologists who have learned to eat Uruguayan veggie is just the new normal,” Friedman writes. Perhaps. But the real question is why the company established those operations in the first place. Having worked as a strategy advisor to TCS since 2000, I can testify that reasons related to the tyranny of time zones, languages, and the need for proximity to clients’ local operations loomed large in that decision. This is a far cry from globalization proponents’ oft-cited world in which geography, language, and distance don’t matter.

Trade flows certainly bear that theory out. Consider Canadian-U.S. trade, the largest bilateral relationship of its kind in the world. In 1988, before the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) took effect, merchandise trade levels between Canadian provinces—that is, within the country—were estimated to be 20 times as large as their trade with similarly sized and similarly distant U.S. states. In other words, there was a built-in “home bias.” Although NAFTA helped reduce this ratio of domestic to international trade—the home bias—to 10 to 1 by the mid-1990s, it still exceeds 5 to 1 today. And these ratios are just for merchandise; for services, the ratio is still several times larger. Clearly, the borders in our seemingly “borderless world” still matter to most people.

Geographical boundaries are so pervasive, they even extend to cyberspace. If there were one realm in which borders should be rendered meaningless and the globalization proponents should be correct in their overly optimistic models, it should be the Internet. Yet Web traffic within countries and regions has increased far faster than traffic between them. Just as in the real world, Internet links decay with distance. People across the world may be getting more connected, but they aren’t connecting with each other. The average South Korean Web user may be spending several hours a day online—connected to the rest of the world in theory—but he is probably chatting with friends across town and e-mailing family across the country rather than meeting a fellow surfer in Los Angeles. We’re more wired, but no more “global.”

Just look at Google, which boasts of supporting more than 100 languages and, partly as a result, has recently been rated the most globalized Web site. But Google’s operation in Russia (cofounder Sergey Brin’s native country) reaches only 28 percent of the market there, versus 64 percent for the Russian market leader in search services, Yandex, and 53 percent for Rambler.

Indeed, these two local competitors account for 91 percent of the Russian market for online ads linked to Web searches. What has stymied Google’s expansion into the Russian market? The biggest reason is the difficulty of designing a search engine to handle the linguistic complexities of the Russian language. In addition, these local competitors are more in tune with the Russian market, for example, developing payment methods through traditional banks to compensate for the dearth of credit cards. And, though Google has doubled its reach since 2003, it’s had to set up a Moscow office in Russia and hire Russian software engineers, underlining the continued importance of physical location. Even now, borders between countries define—and constrain—our movements more than globalization breaks them down.

TURNING BACK THE CLOCK

If globalization is an inadequate term for the current state of integration, there’s an obvious rejoinder: Even if the world isn’t quite flat today, it will be tomorrow. To respond, we have to look at trends, rather than levels of integration at one point in time. The results are telling. Along a few dimensions, integration reached its all-time high many years ago. For example, rough calculations suggest that the number of long-term international migrants amounted to 3 percent of the world’s population in 1900—the high-water mark of an earlier era of migration—versus 2.9 percent in 2005.

Along other dimensions, it’s true that new records are being set. But this growth has happened only relatively recently, and only after long periods of stagnation and reversal. For example, FDI stocks divided by GDP peaked before World War I and didn’t return to that level until the 1990s. Several economists have argued that the most remarkable development over the long term was the declining level of internationalization between the two World Wars. And despite the records being set, the current level of trade intensity falls far short of completeness, as the Canadian-U.S. trade data suggest. In fact, when trade economists look at these figures, they are amazed not at how much trade there is, but how little.

It’s also useful to examine the considerable momentum that globalization proponents attribute to the constellation of policy changes that led many countries—particularly China, India, and the former Soviet Union—to engage more extensively with the international economy. One of the better-researched descriptions of these policy changes and their implications is provided by economists Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner:

“The years between 1970 and 1995, and especially the last decade, have witnessed the most remarkable institutional harmonization and economic integration among nations in world history. While economic integration was increasing throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the extent of integration has come sharply into focus only since the collapse of communism in 1989. In 1995, one dominant global economic system is emerging.”

Yes, such policy openings are important. But to paint them as a sea change is inaccurate at best. Remember the 10 Percent Presumption, and that integration is only beginning. The policies that we fickle humans enact are surprisingly reversible. Thus, Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History, in which liberal democracy and technologically driven capitalism were supposed to have triumphed over other ideologies, seems quite quaint today. In the wake of Sept. 11, 2001, Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations looks at least a bit more prescient. But even if you stay on the economic plane, as Sachs and Warner mostly do, you quickly see counterevidence to the supposed decisiveness of policy openings. The so-called Washington Consensus around market-friendly policies ran up against the 1997 Asian currency crisis and has since frayed substantially—for example, in the swing toward neopopulism across much of Latin America. In terms of economic outcomes, the number of countries—in Latin America, coastal Africa, and the former Soviet Union—that have dropped out of the “convergence club” (defined in terms of narrowing productivity and structural gaps vis-à-vis the advanced industrialized countries) is at least as impressive as the number of countries that have joined the club. At a multilateral level, the suspension of the Doha round of trade talks in the summer of 2006—prompting The Economist to run a cover titled “The Future of Globalization” and depicting a beached wreck—is no promising omen. In addition, the recent wave of cross-border mergers and acquisitions seems to be encountering more protectionism, in a broader range of countries, than did the previous wave in the late 1990s.

Of course, given that sentiments in these respects have shifted in the past 10 years or so, there is a fair chance that they may shift yet again in the next decade. The point is, it’s not only possible to turn back the clock on globalization-friendly policies, it’s relatively easy to imagine it happening. Specifically, we have to entertain the possibility that deep international economic integration may be inherently incompatible with national sovereignty—especially given the tendency of voters in many countries, including advanced ones, to support more protectionism, rather than less. As Jeff Immelt, CEO of GE, put it in late 2006, “If you put globalization to a popular vote in the U.S., it would lose.” And even if cross-border integration continues on its upward path, the road from here to there is unlikely to be either smooth or straight. There will be shocks and cycles, in all likelihood, and maybe even another period of stagnation or reversal that will endure for decades. It wouldn’t be unprecedented.

The champions of globalization are describing a world that doesn’t exist. It’s a fine strategy to sell books and even describe a potential environment that may someday exist. Because such episodes of mass delusion tend to be relatively short-lived even when they do achieve broad currency, one might simply be tempted to wait this one out as well. But the stakes are far too high for that. Governments that buy into the flat world are likely to pay too much attention to the “golden straitjacket” that Friedman emphasized in his earlier book, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, which is supposed to ensure that economics matters more and more and politics less and less. Buying into this version of an integrated world—or worse, using it as a basis for policymaking—is not only unproductive. It is dangerous.

Sunday, 28 October 2007

The globalization and Andrés Ortega



From british online magazine OpenDemocracy magazine you can read Andrés Ortega's view of globalization: globalization is making the world simultaneously unruly and connective, transnational and tribal, cosmopolitan and insular. The result is a potent, transformative fusion of identity-formation and power-capacity.

Andrés Ortega is an editorial writer and columnist at El País and editor of the spanish-language edition of Foreign Policy. He is the author of "Las fuerza de los pocos" (Galaxia Gutenberg, 2007).

The power of the few

If globalisation has made the world flatter, it has also fragmented it into crevices, mountains and a myriad of islets. The new media and the standardising technology favor the multiplication and radicalisation of identities. Today, minorities and fringe groups have a global reach. Against the power of the big ones, there is now the power of the few.

Man no longer defines himself just by what he produces or how he produces it, nor - apart from some exceptions of a religious nature - by what he consumes. For that reason, and because the human being needs to be different in order to have an identity, other cultural, deeper differences are now much more significant. New media, together with migrations and an ever-increasing urbanisation (in 1800, just 3% of the world's population lived in cities; in 2007, for the first time in history, there are more people in urban centres than in the country), make it possible for such differences - including minorities and radical or fringe groups - to have a global reach. Indian social anthropologist Arjun Appadurai calls it the eruption of "small numbers". It is the power of the few, that, despite being scattered, often manage to be many, or much.

An end to singularity

This process can also be called the globalization of differences. Contrary to what some people think, the world has become rougher rather than flatter. At the same time that physical borders are being suppressed, mind-barriers emerge stronger than ever. Along with the world being standardised, it is also being fragmented. In addition, the power of the few benefits from the fact that there is no boss in the world right now. Globalization runs ungoverned. It is being filled by the few, in a world in which "diversity is not just in faraway lands but right here", in the words of Argentinian anthropologist Néstor García Canclini. That is why we must not speak, as Samuel Huntington does, of a "clash of civilisations", nor indeed of an "alliance of civilisations", because globalization has stopped being an external affair to become an internal concern of our societies.

In this world without direction, people more than ever need a sense of community, of belonging, of identity. Nationalisms, ethnicisms and religionisms are part of this phenomenon. Some (least frequently) may cling to cosmopolitanism; others, to a rootless identity which they achieve either through the Internet or on satellite, cable and other TV channels. Therein lies the danger for this age and these media: in the construction of rootless identities. While French philosopher Régis Debray argues that one "becomes delocated as fast as he becomes de-historised", German philosopher Jürgen Habermas maintains that there is nothing more dangerous than "building the future as a response to an almost messianic appeal from the past", especially when the latter has been invented.

New media make it easier for immigrants to keep in touch with their societies of origin, which gives them multiple identities, both as a group and as individuals. Against what Nobel economics laureate Amartya Sen calls the "illusion of a singular identity", denouncing the "miniaturisation of people" through -isms, it is increasingly common (as the International Organisation for Migration confirms) for people to belong to more than one society throughout their lives and to acquire multiple identities in the process.

A planetary technology

In the global south, approximately 2.5 billion people have more or less regular access to television. While in 1991 there was just one channel in India, nowadays there are hundreds. From the 1960s to the 1990s, globalisation meant largely Americanisation. Over recent years, as many media have become global, westernisation has decreased. See for instance channels like al-Jazeera (now also in English), al-Arabiya or India's Star TV. Thus we find what Tunisian writer Abdelwahab Meddeb calls the "Egyptian paradox": as society becomes increasingly Americanised (through the incitement to consumerism and media consumption), the search for specificity becomes more intense and is promoted by those same media, that articulate and convey the difference.

Technology produces the illusion of cultural standardisation even though, in fact, it also favours differences. New media allow for bigger, global distinctions, as well as the creation of new ones. The Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca has its own website, available even in Spanish. The Lebanese Shi'a guerrilla group Hizbollah has its own site too, partly in English as well as in Arab. Moroccan television is seen all over Europe, a continent that also has dozens of Kurdish television channels. In Morocco itself, al-Jazeera is the most influential TV station.

The very concept of mass-communication media is changing. Besides the traditional ones there is of course the proliferating internet, but we must also take into account phenomena such as Google or Yahoo, YouTube, or even SMS and cell-phone messaging, which are becoming media in their own right. And, while television is mainly an iconic medium, this revolution cannot be understood without another, parallel one: the spreading of literacy at a global level. Today, 82% of the world's adults are literate, compared to 52% in 1950. In fact, we are seeing what the sociologist Howard Rheingold calls a new means of social organisation, with new communication channels and new codes. It is a relational planet, one that now has fewer or almost no intermediaries at every level.

New media facilitate contacts between individuals who have common interests but are far away from each other. And minorities, when added up, do not become majorities, but masses. All this benefits diversity, both at a global and at local scale. Minorities, often pushed aside or excluded from society, have inside them their own communication channels, certainly through radio, sometimes through television, and even on paper and on the internet. There are a lot of local newspapers aimed at immigrants, written in their own languages, from Arabic to Chinese. The latest technologies also strengthen transnational networks, both among traditional diaspora groups such as the Chinese and Lebanese and among new ones coming with the most recent migrations.

At the same time, these groups reinforce the products of civil society and even of some businesses. There is a growing capacity to interact and coordinate, both through organisations (O2O) and person-to-person (P2P) exchanges. It is the napsterisation of politics (to use the name of one of the first companies that created such a system for music exchange among users). Virtual communities and tribes emerge.

An exploding connectivity

What happened in Spain from 11-14 March 2004 - the extraordinary, concentrated period between the Atocha bombings in Madrid, demonstrations by 12 million Spaniards on the street in their aftermath, and the election of a new, centre-left government - is perhaps one of the best examples of this change. New media burst into politics, not to replace the older ones, but to supplement them. The internet with its chatrooms, for one; and at the same time, an explosion of phone messaging that mobilised many people in what someone has named a "day of connection" rather than a "day of reflection". It was not just some urban teenager tribe's resource.

These new communication and organisation tools - plus the multiplying effect of the short appeal, "pass it on" - had already appeared before, in previous mobilisations by phone messaging. For instance, the movement that overthrew the president of the Philippines, Joseph Estrada in January 2001 and made him say that he considered himself defeated by a coup de texte; several cases, from Georgia (2003) to Ukraine (2004) and Lebanon (2005), seem to echo this. The power of the few is also "the power of the ‘we'" as described by Business Week's reporter Rob Hof; it is a change in the power structure that has a bearing on the moment in which the intellectual in the traditional sense goes into crisis and the digital intellectual takes shape.

In our times, "to be is to be connected". We lose some social capital of a certain kind (direct physical contact) and we earn another, different one (virtual, often much more far-reaching contact, mainly in aspects that have to do with leisure, as is to be expected). The new connectivity's big novelty is a double one: how strangers connect massively and how just a few can do the same, so that they become many.

Siva Vaidhyanathan, author of The Anarchist in the Library, an analysis of the implications of P2P electronic networks, indicates that we are living a significant change: from information "oligarchy" to "anarchy" (even though it is not really a new thing, since there is a precedent in the gossip about the royal family during the French revolution). The distribution of Ayatollah Khomeini's tape-recorded messages also helped him in the preparation of Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979.

Years ago, Nicholas Negroponte coined the notion of the Daily Me (that could also be TV Me or simply Medium Me), which is the individual's ability to choose the news or the type of news he or she wants to receive, according to his or her tastes or preferences. This can lead people to withdraw themselves into their own beliefs and to avoid the surprises usually delivered by establishment media, which in turn makes it easier to differentiate and more difficult to share experiences. In his book Republic.com, Cass R Sunstein warned about the risk of being exposed only to the news one wants, a trend reinforced by what psychologists call the "unconscious propensity to seek confirmation" of our political or otherwise preferences.

A reviving religiosity

Among such tendencies, religion re-emerges predominantly, once again at the centre of many national and international concerns, in a way that contrasts with the 1970s or 1980s. The tug-of-war between secularising and counter-secularising forces is one of the main subjects in the contemporary sociology of religion. The theory of the inevitability of secularisation is declining, at least for now, in view of the de-secularisation taking place in the world, as sociologist of religion Peter Berger underlines. It is a response to the loss of horizons and sense, to what VS Naipaul desribed as "the void of secular rituals".

The problems are caused by religionisms and fundamentalisms that have achieved or want to achieve a global scope, rather than by religions themselves. Religionism is the attempt to impose or shape public life and politics according to a certain faith or its interpretation: Islamism is a religionism. In fact, the tension between radical and conventional religion has been a feature of nearly every religion. It is born, says Naipaul, from the illusion of religious purity, in a world in which "the rest of us are culturally mixed". Nationalisms, too, can become fundamentalist and usually do. In any case, among fundamentalisms there are a lot of religionisms.

Among young fundamentalists there is an increasing number of converts, both of Islamic and Christian culture. Born-again Christians have a Muslim counterpart (Naipaul was one of the first to talk about born-again Muslims, in 1981) and vice versa, and these converts are radical and fundamentalist when embracing their new beliefs, whether in London, Hamburg or Brussels. Nonetheless, we must not forget that it is only a small portion of those converts that falls into terrorism.

On the whole, these emerging churches or movements are extremely conservative as to sexual morals. This is true both of Muslims and of Christians. In America, participation in established religious groups and rituals has declined in favour of non-traditional ones. In Europe, at least in the Europe that has religious beliefs, there is a similar trend. It is important to note that, in the Christian world, the denominations that have least decreased or most increased in number of followers over the 20th century are the strictest in terms of morality and doctrine.

On the other hand, those who gave some leeway, such as Anglicans and Lutherans in Europe, have a higher rate of defections than Roman Catholics, or Protestant fundamentalists and Evangelicals in America. In Spain, moreover, those movements have been more active in welcoming immigrants than the Catholic church, although this one did make amends after the fact.

A fragmenting diversity

These fundamentalisms and radicalisms take on new strength and scope thanks to the present crisis of values - which, on the other hand, produces an increasing anomie - but also thanks to the possibilities offered them by the new media. Today's world, for all the stated reasons, gives immense opportunities to spread beliefs of this type. These religious interpretations have been able to use globalization in a time of "diversification of religious production" in the whole world and within many societies. The Fundamentalism Project, a University of Chicago series of works that studies empirical cases, observes how electronic technologies, such as satellite, cable, terrestrial and local television, together with the internet, offer new possibilities for proselytism. These groups use market techniques in order to attract followers to the "market-driven evangelical mega-churches of modern America", in the words of American philosopher Daniel Dennett.

When it comes to the survival of religions or denominations, there is also a certain social Darwinism: the ones that survive and multiply are those that know how to adapt (that is, those most capable of gaining converts and keeping them loyal). Their marketing techniques, their music, their sense of community and the use of television by televangelists are more suited to the new demands. Islam also has well-known TV preachers, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, from Qatar. There are fewer intermediaries now. As Time magazine wrote in June 2003: "God has gone user-friendly". In Spain, televangelists began to show on some local channels several years ago, at first as a directly translated version of the American model and later on in Spanish.

It is not nor it will be easy managing this fragmented diversity. Civilisation, Goethe wrote, is "a permanent exercise in respect. Respect for the divine, for the Earth, for fellow men and therefore for our own dignity". The idea of respect is more promising than that of tolerance. It requires acknowledging the other, the others, and talking with everyone, even with those who seem to be just a few. Talking for talk's sake, some will say. But that is not a small thing. To talk about the differences, from the differences and despite the differences is not easy. However, it must be tried. The point is to live together, rather than to convince or, even less, to convert one another. We are doomed to mix with one another, but not to understand one another.
 
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